Abstract-This paper proposes a noncooperative game theoretical technique to replicate data objects across a system of multiple servers in order to reduce user-perceived Web access delays. The proposed technique uses computational agents that compete with each other to optimize the performance of the servers that they represent. In a large multiagent system, agents may act in a self-interested manner because of their local and limited knowledge, which may negatively impact the systemwide performance. The optimality of a noncooperative game is typically described by Nash equilibrium, which is based on spontaneous and nondeterministic strategies. However, Nash equilibrium may or may not guarantee systemwide performance. Furthermore, there can be multiple Nash equilibria, making it difficult to decide which one is the best. In contrast, the proposed technique uses the notion of pure Nash equilibrium, which, if achieved, guarantees stable optimal performance. In the proposed technique, agents use deterministic strategies that work in conjunction with their self-interested nature but ensure systemwide performance enhancement. In general, the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium is hard to achieve, but we prove the existence of such equilibrium in the proposed technique. The proposed technique is also experimentally compared against some well-known conventional replica allocation methods such as branch-and-bound, greedy, and genetic algorithms. The experimental setup incorporates GT-ITM and Inet network topology generators and 1998 Soccer World Cup access logs to closely mimic the Web in its infrastructure and user access patterns.
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INTRODUCTION
A number of frequently accessed websites now use mirror services to enhance their performance and reliability. By mirror services, we imply replicating the most popular contents (data objects or simply objects) of the website; an example of an object in a website is a JPEG image. In such an environment, users requesting the server's content are redirected to the servers holding the replicas. Because each replica sees only a portion of the total requests, clients can be served faster. Furthermore, if users are redirected to the servers holding replicas that exhibit smaller communication times than the original server, access time can be reduced [14] .
Replicating objects across a read-intensive network can potentially reduce the network traffic. On the other hand, with rapid updates, maintaining a large number of replicas can incur a prohibitively high overhead [25] . Discussions in [13] , [17] , [23] , [25] , and [31] reveal that users experience reduced access latencies provided that data is replicated onto servers, which are within their close proximity. However, this is applicable only when read accesses are considered. If updates are also considered, then the locations of the servers holding replicas must to be: 1) in close proximity to the clients, and 2) in close proximity to the primary (assuming a broadcast (or lazy) update model) copy.
For fault-tolerant and highly dependable systems, replication is essential, as demonstrated in a real-world example of OceanStore [15] . Therefore, efficient and effective replica placement methods strongly depend on how many replicas are to be placed in the system and, more importantly, where [18] . This, in the literature, is termed as the replica placement problem (RPP).
A number of techniques for Web RPP have been proposed with the underlying assumption that servers cooperate with one another in order to layout a replica scheme that optimizes the overall system performance [13] . For instance, almost all content distribution network (CDN)-related RPP methods [11] , [13] rely on a centralized decision-making body that optimizes a given objective (such as to reduce the communication times) regardless of the costs incurred by each server [15] . In reality, servers may act in a self-interested manner by maximizing their own benefits, possibly at the expense of the global optimal [4] . This notion is explained in Fig. 1 . (In the figure, the read-write ratio R=W is to be interpreted as R=ðR þ W Þ.) When the number of read requests is high, each selfinterested server replicates the object (Fig. 1b) , which may not be feasible because the cost of maintaining the replicas rises enormously. On the other hand, when writes are predominant, no self-interested server opts to replicate (Fig. 1c) , which may not be feasible because the original server now has to manage the huge influx of access requests. In certain cases, this self-interested behavior may be justifiable [18] ; however, the main problem arises when the read and write accesses are equally balanced, and we are bound to ask the following question ( Fig. 1d ): "How can one make the servers come up with a replica scheme that is beneficial for the whole system?" This paper proposes a game theoretical technique that abstracts the Web (or a large-scale distributed computing system) as an agent-based model [5] . Each server in the system is represented by an agent, which is a computational entity that is capable of autonomous behavior in the sense of being aware of the options available to it when faced with a decision-making task related to its domain of interest [18] . These agents are motivated by their self-interests and compete in a noncooperative replica allocation game ðnRAGÞ. In nRAG, each agent has two possible actions for each object. If accesses are made to an object that is located at a nearby server bearing minor communication times, then the agent is better off redirecting the requests to that server (and possibly removing its replica). On the other hand, if the object is located at a far-off server bearing larger communication times, then the agent is better off replicating that object. Essentially, for each object, the agent makes a binary decision: (0) not to replicate or (1) to replicate. (Note that an agent's decision is reached locally, taking into account local benefits.) It is of interest to see whether these self-interested agents can layout a replica scheme that converges to a global optimum solution targeted toward reducing the communication times induced by accessing the objects or not.
The optimality of a noncooperative game is described by the Nash equilibrium, which is a set of mixed strategies of two or more agents whereby no agent can improve its benefit by changing its strategy unilaterally [27] . It is very interesting to observe how game theory can be used to predict the outcome of a (noncooperative) game that relies on mixed (randomized) strategies. However, for an agent to behave in a self-interested manner, making a random decision on replicating an object is far from reality-they are selfinterested because they deterministically choose to be so [4] . What we are missing in this definition is the notion of deliberate yet rational self-interested behavior. One would be more interested in equilibria with pure (or deterministic) strategies-a pure Nash equilibrium [37] . However, pure Nash equilibria are a rare occurrence in game theory. A fruitful discussion on this phenomenon is provided in [21] . Because agents are autonomous entities [35] , one has to make sure that the pure Nash equilibrium (if one can have) is stable. Equilibrium is said to be stable, when any change in strategy by any agent in the system makes the other agents change their strategies accordingly so as to make the system bounce back to the equilibrium, i.e., once equilibrium is reached, unless that equilibrium is unique, the system can only better itself and not otherwise [37] .
We now give an overview of the proposed nRAG technique. Briefly, nRAG consists of agents that are selfinterested in nature and only use deterministic strategies based on a cost model that is a directed toward minimizing the communication times incurred due to object movement in the network. nRAG, which takes in as input an arbitrary replica schema, allows these agents to evolve the replica scheme to one that exhibits a pure Nash equilibrium. We would like to clarify that we do not use (the emerging oracle) price of anarchy (PoA) [21] as a measure to quantify the performance of nRAG. We admit that PoA is an extremely useful tool, but it is most effective against stochastic systems. An elaborate discussion on this claim is provided in [37] . Since nRAG has only deterministic outputs, we cannot possibly use PoA. However, we do perform comparative studies in an elaborate experimental setup against some well-known replica allocation methods.
We summarize the major contributions of this paper as follows: Fig. 1 . An example depicting the self-interested behavior of the servers. In each of the subfigures, the cost of communication for the dark lines is twice more than the thin lines. (a) Initially, the network contains one copy of the object. Shown by the dark circle. (b) When the read requests are more than the write requests (e.g., the read-write ratio R=W ¼ 0:75), every servers tends to replicate the object. (c) On the other hand, when R=W ¼ 0:25, no server opts to replicate the object, and the original server is left to deal with all the accesses to that object. (d) The difficulty arises when the accesses are perfectly balanced ðR=W ¼ 0:5Þ.
World Cup traffic logs [1] . The experimental results reveal that nRAG's solution quality is competitive to other centralized approaches and exhibits fast execution time. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 focuses on some important background information related to the RPP, followed by a formal description of the RPP in Section 3. Section 4 concentrates on modeling the RPP as nRAG. Comparative experimental results are provided in Section 5, which are followed by a summary of related work and final concluding remarks in Sections 6 and 7, respectively.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE RPP
There are a number of issues related to the RPP. The foremost important issue that needs to be resolved is the choice between static and dynamic replica placement [39] . Static replica placement assumes a course-granularity decision based on the observed access characteristics. With dynamic replica placement, the system constantly monitors accesses to various resources and continuously adjusts the replica scheme. Dynamic replica placement techniques adapt reasonably well to the changing dynamics of the system; however, the computational complexity has always been a major problem to the extent that replica placements become invalid instantaneously [36] . Moreover, dynamic replica placement techniques incur multifolds of extra traffic in order to maintain data consistency. As observed in [32] , the choice between these two approaches is not that obvious. One major advantage of static placement is that it imposes less stringent requirements for the request distribution algorithm (RDA) [24] , because the latter must not allow predicting effects of individual object replication. Therefore, a more efficient RDA can be used for improved traffic reduction.
The RPP literature makes two classifications of RDAs: 1) feedback and 2) nonfeedback algorithms. It has been argued in [32] that nonfeedback algorithms, although being very straightforward, perform better than feedback algorithms. This is because feedback schemes make it difficult to predict the effects of an object replication on request distribution, as the request distribution of an object becomes dependent on the popularity of many other objects colocated at the same servers. Hence, moving one object may affect the request distribution for other objects and servers. This observation is reported in [33] , where a number of RDAs were considered, and a nonfeedback technique, nearest neighbor (always choose the closest replica), performed better than other RDAs.
Another important issue is to choose a meaningful performance metric. In the RPP literature, many difference metrics are referenced: 1) reducing end-user access time [39] , 2) data availability [7] , and 3) object transfer cost (OTC) [25] . Among all of them, the OTC metric is the most widely accepted and general and effectively captures the crux of the rest of the metrics [24] . The OTC is defined as the cumulative cost of data object movement within the network to satisfy read and write requests of users connected to the servers. Minimizing the OTC would in effect 1) reduce the end user access time because requests will be processed quickly from their closest replicas and 2) increase data availability because data has to be replicated in order for the OTC to be reduced.
Yet another important issue is to agree on an efficient data access model. In RPP literature, one can find two major classifications of access models: 1) read one write all (ROWA) and 2) non-ROWA. With ROWA protocols, the data is replicated in such a way that for most users, there is a nearby replica of the data object. A read operation can be done from any replica in the system, and therefore, it is very efficient. To ensure consistency of the data, a write operation is performed on all replicas, and hence, it is very expensive. With non-ROWA protocols, the underlying replica scheme does not really matter because for both reads and writes, users must access multiple replicas and resolve consistency issues by using some form of a quorumbased approach [34] . Hence, non-ROWA protocols are expensive to implement because extra mechanisms must be put in place to ensure up-to-date contents. With ROWA protocols, the write operation is observably expensive, but when coupled with the OTC metric, it results in a very efficient protocol [25] .
In essence, from the pros and cons discussed above, our aim in this research is to propose a static game theoretical replica placement technique that allows ROWA protocols and where the performance metric is to minimize the cumulative OTC in the system.
FORMAL DESCRIPTION OF THE RPP
The system model under consideration is a large-scale distributed computing system, where users access data that are held by the servers. Below, we elucidate a few systemrelated assumptions:
1. Each server is assigned a unique server identifier.
There are a total of M servers in the system, and S i ð1 i MÞ denotes a server identifier. 2. Each data object is assigned a unique object identifier. There are a total of N data objects in the system, and O k ð1 k NÞ denotes a data object identifier. 3. The original copy of an object is held by a particular server in the system called the primary server, denoted by P k . 4. Each server has a limited storage capacity denoted by s i . 5. The read and write frequencies are known a priori (or observed through access logs). 6. For writes, we assume a "broadcast" model, which is a ROWA protocol [25] . Based on the above system overview and the underlying assumptions, if we are to find an optimal placement of replicas in a large-scale distributed computing system, then we must incorporate, among others, the following parameters in a brute-force (exhaustive search) method [20] :
1. the access frequency of each data object, 2. the time remaining until each data object is updated next, 3. the probability that each server functions properly during the lifespan of the system, and 4. the probability that the network will remain connected during the lifespan of the system. Even if some looping is possible, the computational complexity is very high, and this calculation must be done every time if any of the above parameters change. Moreover, parameters 3 and 4 cannot be formulated in practice because faults do not follow a known phenomenon. For these reasons, we take the following heuristic approach:
1. Replicas are relocated only during the relocation period [11] . 2. At every relocation period, replica allocation is determined based on the access (both read and update) frequency of each data object and the network topology at that moment.
Problem Formulation
Consider the Web (or a large-scale distributed computing system) comprising M servers, with each server having its own processing power, memory (primary storage), and media (secondary storage). Let S i and s i be the name and the total storage capacity (in simple data units, e.g., blocks), respectively, of server i, where 1 i M. The M servers of the system are connected by a communication network. A link between two servers S i and S j (if it exists) has a positive integer cði; jÞ associated with it, giving the communication cost for transferring a data unit between servers S i and S j . If the two servers are not directly connected by a communication link, then the above cost is given by the sum of the costs of all the links in a chosen path from server S i to the server S j . Without the loss of generality, we assume that cði; jÞ ¼ cðj; iÞ. (This is a common assumption, e.g., see [13] , [17] , [25] , and [31] ). Let there be N data objects, each identifiable by a unique name O k and size in simple data units o k , where 1 k N. Let r i k and w i k be the total number of reads and writes, respectively, initiated from S i for O k during a certain time period t. This time period t determines when to instigate the relocation period so that the replica placement algorithm can be invoked. Note that this time period t is the only parameter that requires human intervention. However, in this paper, we use analytical data that enables us to effectively predict the time interval t (see Section 5.3 for details).
Our replication policy assumes the existence of one primary copy for each data object in the network. Let P k be the server that holds the primary copy of O k , i.e., the only copy in the network that cannot be deallocated, hence referred to as primary server of the kth object. Each primary server P k contains information about the whole replication scheme R k of O k . This can be done by maintaining a list of the servers where the kth object is replicated at, called from now on the replicators of O k . Moreover, every server S i stores a two-field record for each object. The first field is its primary server P k , and the second is the nearest neighborhood server NN that NN i k ¼ P k if the primary server is the closest one holding a replica of O k . When a server S i reads an object, it does so by addressing the request to the corresponding NN i k . For the updates, we assume that every server can update every object. Updates of an object O k are performed by sending the updated version to its primary server P k , which afterward broadcasts it to every server in its replication scheme R k .
For the RPP under consideration, we are interested in minimizing the total network transfer cost due to object movement, i.e., the OTC. The communication cost of the control messages has minor impact on the overall performance of the system (for an elaborate discussion on this issue and examples of possible control messages, see [25] ); therefore, we do not consider it in the transfer cost model, but it is to be noted that incorporation of such a cost would be a trivial exercise.
There are two components affecting OTC. The first component of OTC is due to the read requests. Let R i k denote the total OTC, due to S i s' reading requests for object O k , addressed to the nearest server NN i k . This cost is given by the following:
The second component of OTC is the cost arising due to the writes. Let W i k be the total OTC, due to S i s' writing requests for object O k , addressed to the primary server P k . This cost is given as
Here, we made the indirect assumption that in order to perform a write, we need to ship the whole updated version of the object. This, of course, is not always the case, as we can move only the updated parts of it (modeling such policies can also be done using our framework). The cumulative OTC, denoted as C overall , due to reads and writes is given by
Let X ik ¼ 1 if S i holds a replica of object O k and 0 otherwise. X ik s define an M Â N replication matrix, named X, with Boolean elements. Equation (3) is now refined to
Servers that are not the replicators of object O k create an OTC equal to the communication cost of their reads from the nearest replicator plus that of sending their writes to the primary server of O k . Servers belonging to the replication scheme of O k are associated with the cost of receiving all the updated versions of it. Using the above formulation, the data replication problem can be defined as follows:
Find the assignment of 0-1 values in the X matrix that minimizes C overall , subject to 1) the storage capacity constraint, P N k¼1 X ik o k s i 8ð1 i MÞ, and 2) the primary copy policy,
In the generalized case, the RPP has been proven to be NP-complete [25] .
NONCOOPERATIVE REPLICA ALLOCATION GAME (nRAG)
Definition 1 (self-interested agent). A self-interested agent is a computational entity that is capable of making decisions that best represents its goals.
In this research, we use the self-interested model because we consider a noncooperative game. For cooperative games, the usual model considered for agents is the collaborative model in which the agents collectively optimize a global objective [19] . In noncooperative games, sometimes, the selfish model is also considered [20] . The selfish model is different from the self-interested one, in the sense that agents are not only self-interested but also have the capability to manipulate the resource allocation mechanism by lying or colluding with other agents. In game theory, such situations are studied via Algorithmic Mechanism Design (AMD) [28] techniques, by designing a payment scheme that forces the agents to always tell the truth and follow the rules. The selfish model is not considered in this paper, but curious readers are encouraged to review the work reported in [4] , [18] , and [22] , which directly address the selfish model in the context of the RPP.
Definition 2 (feasible strategies). An agent i's strategy is termed feasible ' i , when the two constraints of the data replication problem (storage and no deallocation of primary copy) are met before a decision to replicate an object O k can be undertaken.
Of all of the infinitely many feasible strategies, let & i 2 ' i be a strategy chosen by an agent i, where & i ¼ 1 means that object is replicated, and & i ¼ 0 means that it is not. (Note that & i only focuses on a specific object O k . Therefore, it is not necessary to write & i as & i;k or any other notation that would differentiate between O k and O k 0 .) Since each agent chooses & i 2 ' i independently (keeping both the constraints at par), we can look at the replication of each object O k as a separate game and combine the pure Nash equilibrium of these games to obtain a pure Nash equilibrium of the multiobject game, nRAG. (This argument would become clearer when Definition 4 and Lemma 1 are reviewed.) Definition 3 (strategy profile) [29] . A strategy profile & ¼ ð& 1 ; . . . ; & M Þ is a set of strategies. An element in this set corresponds to the strategy of an individual agent that fully specifies all of its actions. A strategy profile must include one and only one strategy for every agent.
For convenience, we can also write & as ð& i ; & Ài Þ, where & i is the strategy of agent i, and & Ài is the set of strategies of all other agents in nRAG excluding agent i. Given &, one can easily find out which agents have opted to replicate O k .
Definition 4 (pure Nash equilibrium) [37] . A situation in a noncooperative game in which agents play using a set of deterministic strategies whereby no agent can improve its benefit by changing its strategy unilaterally.
Lemma 1 (combining pure Nash equilibria) [8] . If two games are known to have a pure Nash equilibrium, then their union is also guaranteed to have a pure Nash equilibrium. 
Definition 6 (stability of a pure Nash equilibrium) [37] .
Equilibrium is stable if an infinitesimally small change in the strategy of one agent leads to a situation where the following holds: 1) the agent who did not change has no better strategy in the new circumstance, and 2) the agent who did change is now playing with a strictly worse strategy.
Finally, we accentuate on the difference between & and R k (replica schema of O k ). If we are given R k , we only know which servers hold a copy of O k , but if & is given, we can also find out which agents have not opted to replicate O k along with their corresponding cost functions.
Definition 7 (replica schema).
A replica schema R k is the set of servers that hold a replica of O k .
Below, we proceed with describing the game structure of nRAG.
The Setup
The Web (or large-scale distributed computing system) described in Section 3.1 is considered, where an agent represents each server, i.e., nRAG contains M agents. Although nRAG is noncooperative in nature, there is no information hiding. That is, the network topology, the size of the object, and the location of nearest neighbor servers holding replicas are all public knowledge. The only information that is private to each agent is the access frequencies for each object from its server.
In practice, this (information sharing) may seem to be infeasible because a large amount of information has to be stored at each server. However, the ROWA policy implies that each server should record the information about the nearest neighbor server, which holds the replica of a data object to which a user connected to the server issues access requests. Hence, if this information is recorded, then the corresponding network links can be traversed to build a snapshot of the network and also obtain the size of the data object. Moreover, because each server is only interested in those objects to which access have been generated, it only has to record a partial network or a snapshot and not the entire network. Furthermore, this assumption (about information sharing) has been undertaken in almost every RPP technique, e.g., [2] , [4] , [6] , [17] , [18] , [22] , [23] , and [31] .
Cost Model
Because we are interested in analyzing the resulting replica scheme due to the competition to replicate O k among selfinterested agents, we first concentrate on deriving the cost model for a single object. (This will be expanded later on to fully encapsulate the multiobject RPP as described in Section 3.1).
Let ' i be the set of feasible strategies for an agent i. For O k , the agent chooses a strategy & i 2 ' i that describes its desire to replicate or otherwise. Thus, given a strategy profile &, we say that an agent i incurs a cost i ð&Þ if it considers replicating object O k . This cost is given as
which implies that if an agent replicates O k , then the cost incurred due to reads is 0 ¼ r
The cost incurred due to local writes (or updates) is equal to zero since the copy resides locally, but whenever O k is updated anywhere in the network, agent i has to continuously update O k 's contents locally as well. Therefore, the aggregate cost of writes is equivalent to w k i o k AE 8ðj2R k Þ;i6 ¼j cðP k ; jÞ À Á . On the other hand, if an agent does not replicate O k , then the cost incurred due to reads is equal to r k i o k c i; NN k i À Á , and the cost incurred due to writes is equal to w k i o k cði; P k Þ since it only has to send the update to the primary server, which then broadcasts the update based on R k to the agents who have replicated the object. Equation (5) (above) captures the dilemma faced by an agent i when considering replicating O k . If agent i replicates O k , then it brings down the read cost to zero, but now, it has to keep the contents of O k up to date. If agent i does not replicate O k , then it reduces the overhead of keeping the contents up to date, but now, it has to redirect the read requests to the nearest neighbor server that holds a copy of O k . Keeping these cost considerations in mind, for each object O k , each agent i has two strategies, (0) not to replicate or (1) to replicate, allowing us to rewrite (5) in a visually appealing form:
Discussion on Cost Model
Each agent i's cost to replicate an O k (or otherwise) sturdily relies on the access (both read and write) frequencies, the nearest neighbor servers holding replicas, and the size of O k ðo k Þ. Essentially, nRAG starts with a given (possibly a random) replica schema and evolves it into a replica schema that exhibits a pure Nash equilibrium as each agent alters its strategy so as to minimize its cost. That is, a pure Nash equilibrium ð&
Recall that there can be infinitely many feasible strategies, which in turn means that there can be infinitely many replica schemas that are identifiable by a pure Nash equilibrium. Let C À represent the set of all possible pure Nash equilibrium replica schemas, and we say the following definition. 
We observe that for an object O k 's replica schema to be in a state of pure Nash equilibrium, each agent i has placed O k 's replica at a server that incurs the minimum possible communication cost from S i . (That is, if the replica is not placed at i, then it is replicated at a server j that has the minimum cost of communication from S i , compared to any other server in the system.) On the other hand if agent i has already replicated object O k , then there is no benefit for agent i to drop the replica since the location incurs a minimal communication cost to at least one server (which holds the replica). Note that what we have just discussed above ( (7) and (8)) is equivalent to the two conditions (conditions 1 and 2, respectively) of equilibrium stability as stated in Definition 6. With this said, we now expand this single object replica allocation cost model to the multiobject data replication problem. First, let us see what is the cost incurred by the society (all M agents) as a whole.
Definition 9 (social optimum) [29] . The social optimum is the maximum net benefits for everybody in the society, regardless of who enjoys the benefits or incurs the cost.
Social optimum is the analogous concept of optimum resource allocation. In this paper, since the resources are replicas, we can say that the social optimum is equivalent to the optimum replica allocation, and we note the following definition.
Definition 10 (pareto optimum) [29] . A pareto optimum is a situation in which it is not possible to make any one agent better off without making some other agent worse off.
Lemma 2 (a condition for pareto optimum) [29] . A pareto optimum is not possible unless the net benefits for every agent in society are maximized.
In an ideal price-based competitive economy, achieving a social (or pareto) optimum is not a big deal [29] . Every agent maximizes its private benefit, but since every agent pays for any benefits it receives and bears only the corresponding costs, the result of this private benefit maximization is that social net benefits are maximized. However, when pricing is not involved (as is the case in nRAG), it is no longer trivial to guarantee social optimum. We write the social cost for nRAG as
Refining (9) using the definition of social optimum, we say that
Equation (10) encapsulates the notion of cooperation among all agents to layout a replica schema that incurs minimum communication cost. But the agents are selfinterested; hence, we use ð& min Þ as an important measure for the solution quality. What the self-interested agents are trying to achieve in conjunction with ð& min Þ is
Using Lemma 1, we say that
Expanding (12) using (5), we obtain
Thus, the pure Nash equilibrium in nRAG may exist when over the set of all objects N, all M agents maximize their benefits (by minimizing the communication costs). A closer look at (13) reveals that it is nothing more than the minimization problem described by (3) . Hence, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 1 (equivalence). The data replication problem and
nRAG are equivalent and have the same objective.
Based on the above discussion, we describe the procedure for nRAG in Fig. 2. 
Description of the nRAG Procedure
The nRAG procedure is invoked at each relocation period. The input of the nRAG is the current replica scheme R k for all O k . The output of the nRAG is a replica scheme R k for all O k that exhibit a pure Nash equilibrium. Each server maintains a list L i . (We will use the terms server and agents interchangeably to describe the nRAG procedure.) L i is a dynamic list that is populated and depopulated according to the feasibility constraints as described in Definition 2. L i contains all of the objects that an agent i can possibly consider for replication, i.e., it contains all the objects that are not the primary data objects and whose size is less than the currently available storage capacity b i of server S i . To maintain concurrency and share some essential information among the agents, we make use of a control thread that is a global entity called mechanism . maintains a list LS, which consists of all the servers that can potentially replicate data objects, i.e., S i 2 LS if L i 6 ¼ NULL. Also, when an object is replicated, is used to message all the agents to update their nearest neighbors. The nRAG procedure works iteratively. In each step, the servers concurrently (Line 04) calculate the benefit of replicating or not replicating an object O k using (6). This information is used by an agent to decide whether to replicate or not a data object. (Recall that the benefit is larger when the cost of (6) is smaller.) If an agent decides to replicate a data object, then the agent sends a message to informing it of its decision (Line 08).
in turn sends a broadcast message to all of the M agents to update their nearest neighbor list (Line 09). For the odd case where the agent decides to deallocate a currently replicated data object, the agent sends a message to of its decision (Line 14). in turn sends a broadcast message to all of the M agents to update their nearest neighbor list (Line 15). (Note that always broadcasts this information to all of the M agents and not just to the agents in list LS.) In either case, after a decision is taken, each agent updates the currently available server storage capacity b i (Lines 07 and 13) and evicts the object from the list L i (Line 18). If for a particular agent i, the situation arises where its list L i becomes empty, then it sends a message to to update the list LS (Line 20). The nRAG procedure continues until LS 6 ¼ NULL.
The procedure described in Fig. 2 allows us to deduce some fruitful conclusions.
Theorem 2 (existence of pure Nash equilibrium). A pure Nash equilibrium exists for the self-interested agents if they play according to the cost model of single object nRAG.
Proof. Let M denote the set of agents in the system, where each agent represents a server. Let cði; NN k i Þ represent the cost of assessing object O k from server S i to be replicated at the nearest server from NN from M. This is done because no server ðmÞ has incentive to replicate O k since it can access m's replica at a lower or equal cost than NN k i 's replica. nRAG iteratively chooses a server m until M is empty. Again, since at each iteration, m is the remaining server with minimum cði; mÞ, no other server can be selected to replicate O k such that cði; NN k i Þ cði; mÞ. Hence, no agent can gain benefit by unilaterally opting to replicate an object without disturbing the equilibrium. t u Theorem 3 (nRAG pure Nash equilibrium). A pure Nash equilibrium exists for nRAG.
Proof. The proof follows from Lemma 1 and Theorem 2. t u
Theorem 4 (runtime of nRAG). In the worst case, the nRAG procedure takes OðMNÞ time.
Proof. The worst-case scenario is when each server has sufficient capacity to replicate all objects. In that case, the while loop (Line 01) performs M iterations. The time complexity for each iteration is governed by the for loop (Line 03), which takes at most N iterations. Hence, we conclude that the worst-case runtime of nRAG is OðMNÞ. t u
An Illustrative Example
Consider a network of eight servers, as depicted in Fig. 3a .
In the figure, the locations of the primary data objects and their corresponding replicas are noticeable. For instance, the primary location of data object O 1 is at server S 5 , and the corresponding replicas are at servers S 4 , S 6 , and S 8 . (In this example, we will use the terms servers and agents interchangeably.) Each communication link is labeled with its corresponding cost. This cost is calculated by assuming that the propagation speed on a link is equal to 2:8 Â 10 8 m=s (copper wire). Therefore, using Table 1 , which records the distance and the bandwidth between two directly connected servers, we can easily calculate the corresponding cost. For instance, the distance between S 4 and S 6 is given as 10 km, and the corresponding bandwidth on this link is 100 Mbps; then, it means that the cost to communicate 1 Kbyte of data between S 4 and S 6 is equivalent to 10 km=ð2:8 Â 10 8 m=sÞ þ 1 Kbyte=ð100 MbpsÞ ¼ 0:12 ms, and the cost would simply be 0.12 ms. Table 2 shows the available storage capacity of each server, and Table 3 records the smallest cost path and its transfer cost from a given agent to the primary data location, the smallest cost path and its transfer cost from a given agent to the nearest neighbor, and the read and write frequencies of a given agent to the data object. Table 2 is used by the agents to populate their L i lists because that will inform the agents if they have enough storage space to replicate an object or otherwise. (Note that this is a dynamic list, for instance, space may become available for an object after a replica is deallocated.) Table 4 records the OTC for the network before nRAG is invoked. When the nRAG is invoked, all agents concurrently compute their benefit for replicating or not replicating an object based on (6), keeping the RPP constraints in view. Table 5 shows each agent's (benefit) computation for O 1 . Note that Agent 5 is not shown in Table 5 because it holds the primary copy, and therefore, O 1 is not in L 5 . It can be seen in Fig. 3b Table 6 . Similarly, for O 2 the decision making and the corresponding OTC can be seen in Tables 7 and 8 , respectively. For O 2 , Agent 1 is the primary data holder, and it is not shown in Table 7 ; also, Agent 8 does not have enough space on S 8 , and it is not shown in Table 7 . Because we only consider two primary objects in this example, the aggregate OTC for the system recorded in Table 8 should be interpreted as the final OTC of the system. Fig. 3c shows that the final replica scheme has considerable changes than the original replica scheme. The cumulative decrease in OTC can be observed by inspecting Tables 4 (last row) and 8 (last row), which show an improvement of 14:64 percent ð¼ ðð57;024 À 48;674Þ=57;024Þ Â 100Þ. What is interesting to observe in Fig. 3d , which depicts each agent's individual contributing cost toward the OTC, is that not all agents decrease their contributing OTC. This is the crux of the pure Nash equilibrium. Fig. 3d in itself does not carry so much of a meaning because the agent's already know the current replica scheme; therefore, they have a limited strategy set to work with. What would be interesting to observe is the effect of the equilibrium if all possible combinations of input replica schemas were considered. 
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND THE DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
We performed experiments on a 440-MHz Ultra 10 machine with 512-Mbyte memory. The experimental evaluations were targeted to benchmark the placement policies. nRAG was implemented using Ada, and Ada GNAT's distributed systems annex GLADE [30] .
Network Topologies
To establish diversity in our experimental setups, the network connectivity was changed considerably. We used four types of network topologies, which is explained below.
(All in all, we employed 37 various topologies. The parameters chosen for each topology were based on the options available in the GT-ITM and the Inet network topology generators.)
Flat Methods
In flat random methods, a graph G ¼ ðV ; EÞ is built by adding edges to a given set of nodes V subject to a probability function P ðu; vÞ, where u and v are arbitrary nodes of G. Below, we articulate the two flat methods used in this study. Pure random model. A random graph GðM; P ðedge ¼ pÞÞ with 0 p 1 contains all graphs with nodes (servers) M in which the edges are chosen independently with probability p. Although this approach is extremely simple, it fails to capture significant properties of Web-like topologies [10] . The five pure random topologies were obtained using GT-ITM [40] topology generator with p ¼ f0:4; 0:5; 0:6; 0:7; 0:8g. In each of these topologies, the distance between two servers was reverse mapped to the communication cost of transmitting 1 Kbyte of data, by randomly assigning bandwidth to edges from the range [1 Mbps-10 Mbps]. On each edge, the propagation speed is assumed to be 2:8 Â 10 8 m=s. Waxman model. The shortcomings of pure random topologies can be overcome by using the Waxman model. In this method, edges are added between pairs of nodes ðu; vÞ with probability P ðu; vÞ that depends on the distance dðu; vÞ between u and v. The Waxman model is given by the following [38] : P ðu; vÞ ¼ e Àdðu;vÞ L , where L is the maximum distance between any two nodes, and , 2 ð0; 1. is used to control the density of the graph. The larger the value of , the denser is the graph. is used to control the connectivity of the graph. The smaller the value of , the larger is the number of short edges [10] . The 12 Waxman topologies were obtained using the GT-ITM [40] topology generator with values of ¼f0:1; 0:15; 0:2; 0:25g and ¼f0:2; 0:3; 0:4g.
Power-Law Model
The power-law model [26] takes its inspiration from the Zipf law [41] and incorporates rank, out-degree, and eigen exponents. We used the Inet [3] topology generator to obtain the power-law-based Internet topologies. Briefly, Inet generates Autonomous System (AS)-level topologies. These networks have similar, if not the exact, characteristics of the Internet from November 1997 to June 2000. The system takes in, as input, two parameters to generate topologies: 1) the total number of nodes and 2) the fraction k of degree-1 nodes. Briefly, Inet starts from the total number of desired nodes and computes the number of months t it would take to grow the Internet from its size in November 1997 (which was 3,037 nodes) to the desired number of nodes. Using t, it calculates the growth frequency and the out-degree of the nodes in the network. This information is used to iteratively connect nodes till the required out-degree of nodes is reached. The 20 power-law topologies were obtained using 
Access Patterns
To evaluate the replica placement methods under realistic traffic patterns, we used the access logs collected at the 1998 Soccer World Cup website [1] . The Soccer World Cup access log has more than 1.35 billion requests, making it extremely useful to benchmark a given approach over a prolonged high access rate. An important point to note is that these logs are access (or read) logs; thus, they do not relay any TABLE 2 Available Storage Capacity at Each Server information regarding the write requests. However, there is a tedious way around this. Each entry of the access logs has, among other parameters, the information about the size of the object that is currently being accessed. The logs were processed to observe the variance in the object size. For each entry that returns a change in the object size, a mock write request was generated for that user for the object that is currently being accessed.
We used 88 days of the 1998 Soccer World Cup access logs, i.e., the (24-hour) logs from 30 April 1998 to (6)) 26 July 1998. To process the logs, we wrote a script that returned only those objects that were presented in all the logs (from this, we choose 25,000 data objects at random-the maximum workload for our experimental evaluations), the total number of requests from a particular client for an object, and the average and the variance of the object size. From this log, we chose the top 3,718 clients (maximum experimental setup). (We will describe below how we came up with the number 3,718.) A random mapping was then performed of the clients to the nodes of the topologies. Note that this mapping is not 1-1, rather 1-M. This gave us enough skewed workload to mimic real-world scenarios. It is also worthwhile to mention that the total amount of requests entertained for each problem instance using the Soccer World Cup access logs was in the range of three to four million. The primary replicas' original server was mimicked by choosing random locations. The capacities of the servers C (in percentage) were generated randomly with range from Total Primary Object Sizes/2 to 1.5 Â Total Primary Object Sizes. The variances in the object size collected from the access were used to mimic the object updates. The updates were randomly pushed onto different servers.
Because the access logs were of the year 1998, we first used Inet to estimate the number of nodes in the network. This number came up to be 3,718, i.e., there were 3,718 AS-level nodes in the Internet at the time when the 1998 Soccer World Cup was being played. Therefore, we set the upper bound on the number of servers in the system to be M ¼ 3;718. Due to space limitations, we only provide the averaged performance of all the comparative algorithms over all of the 37 topologies and 88 access logs.
The Determination of the Relocation Period
As mentioned previously (in Section 3.1), the time (interval t) when to initiate the replica placement techniques requires high-level human intervention. Here, we will show that this parameter, if not totally, can at least partially be automated. The decision when to initiate the replica placement techniques depends on the past trends of the user access patterns. Fig. 4 shows the average (over the entire access log) user access patterns extracted from the 1998 Soccer World Cup log. In Fig. 4 , we can clearly see that the 1998 Soccer World Cup website incurred soaring and stumpy traffic at various intervals during the 24-hour time period (it is to be noted that the logs have a time stamp of GMT þ 1). For example, the website records its minimum requests at 0500 hours. This would be an ideal time to invoke the replica placement techniques, because the traffic is at its minimum, and fewer users will be affected by the relocation of data objects in the network. Another potential time period for invoking the replica placement techniques is at 1,800 hours. In our experiments, we did not use this time period since the volume of traffic at 1,800 hours is enormous, and it immediately soars, thus leaving little buffer time for the completion of the replica placement techniques.
Comparative Algorithms
For comparison, we chose three types of replica allocation methods. To provide a fair comparison, the assumptions and system parameters were kept the same in all the methods. For the data replication problem, the techniques proposed in [17] , [23] , [25] , and [31] are the only ones that address a problem domain similar to ours. We select from [31] the greedy approach (Greedy) for comparison because it is shown to be the best compared with four other approaches (including the proposed technique in [23] ); thus, we indirectly compare with four additional approaches as well. Algorithms reported in [17] (the efficient branch-and-bound-based technique A"-Star) and [25] (the genetic-algorithm-based method GRA) are also among the chosen techniques for comparisons. Below, we give a brief description of the comparative techniques; however, we encourage the readers to obtain a detailed insight on the comparative techniques from the referenced papers.
A"-Star. It takes inspiration from the A-Star technique and uses two lists OPEN and FOCAL. The FOCAL list is a sublist of OPEN and contains only those nodes that do not deviate from the lowest f node by a factor greater than 1 þ ". That is, we can say that FOCAL ¼fnjfðnÞ ð1þ"Þ min n 0 2OPEN fðn 0 Þg. The technique works similar to A-Star, with the exception that the node selection (lowest h) is done not from the OPEN but from the FOCAL list. The main intuition behind A"-Star is that according to the estimates of f, all nodes in FOCAL have roughly equal solution paths. Therefore, rather than spending time on deciding which among them is the best, it makes more sense to use the time to compute the remaining portion of the solution from within FOCAL. (Notice that when " ¼ 0, A"-Star reduces to A-Star. For A"-Star, we set " to be the mean value of g in the FOCAL list.) The heuristic used by the A"-Star is described as follows: Let O k and S i represent the set of objects and servers in the system. Let U be the set of unassigned objects and t be the global minimum of an object's replication cost. Thus, we can define the minimum of such a cost as a set: T ¼ min 0 j NÀ1 ðtðO k ; S i ÞÞ, 8O k 2 U. For a node n, let mmkðnÞ define the maximum element of set T (the max-min replication cost). mmkðnÞ then represents the best possible replica allocation without the unrealistic assumption that every object in U can be replicated to a server in M without conflict.
Greedy. We modify the Greedy algorithm reported in [31] to fit our problem formulation. The technique works in an iterative fashion. In the first iteration, all the M servers are investigated to find the replica location of the first among a total of N objects. Consider that we choose an object O k for replication. The algorithm recursively makes calculations based on the assumption that all the users in the system request for O k . Thus, we must pick a server that yields the highest impact on reducing the OTC for O k . In the second iteration, the location for the second server is considered. Based on the choice of O k , the algorithm now would identify the second server for replication that, in conjunction with the server already picked, yields the highest impact on reducing the OTC. Observe here that this assignment may or may not be for the same object O k . The algorithm progresses forward until either one of the RPP constraints are violated.
GRA. The Genetic Replication Algorithm (GRA) exploits the mix-and-match technique. Chromosomes represent the various replication schema and each consist of M genes (one for each server). Every gene is composed of N bits (one for each object). A 1 value in the kth bit of the ith gene denotes that the ith server holds a replica of the kth object, and it is 0 otherwise. Using this chromosome encoding, a two-point crossover, a 1 percent mutation rate, roulette wheel selection, and fitness operations (based on the performance metric as described in Section 5) are performed to report the best chromosome as the final solution.
Performance Metric
In all experiments, we examine the average percentage OTC savings (ðX noreplicas ÀX replicas Þ=X noreplicas Â100, where X noreplicas is the OTC of the system when there are only primary data objects, and X replicas is the OTC when the system has replicas placed by an algorithm) of each of the four methods.
Comparative Analysis
We study the behavior of the placement techniques when the number of servers increases (Fig. 5) , by setting the number of objects to 25,000, while in Fig. 6 , we study the behavior when the number of objects increase, by setting the number of servers to 3,718. For the first experiment, we fixed C ¼ 30 percent and R=W ¼ 0:25. We intentionally chose a high workload so as to see if the techniques studied successfully handled the extreme cases. By adding a server in the network, we introduce additional traffic due to its local requests, together with more storage capacity to be used for replication. nRAG balances and explores these diverse effects so as to achieve the highest OTC savings. GRA showed the worst performance along all the techniques. It showed an initial gain, since with the increase in the number of servers, the population permutations increase exponentially, but with a further increase in the number of servers, this phenomenon is not so observable, as all the essential objects are already replicated. The top performing techniques (nRAG and A"-Star)
showed an almost constant performance increase (after the initial surge in OTC savings). GRA also showed a similar trend but maintained lower OTC savings. This was in line with the claims presented in [17] and [25] .
To observe the effect of increase in the number of objects in the system, we chose a softer workload with C ¼ 20 percent and R=W ¼ 0:70. The intention was to observe the trends for all the algorithms under various workloads. The increase in the number of objects has diverse effects on the system as new read/write patterns (since the users are offered more choices) emerge, and also, the strain on the overall storage capacity of the system increases (due to the increase in the number of replicas). An effective replica allocation method should incorporate both the opposing trends. From the plot, the most surprising result came from GRA. It dropped its savings from 47 percent to 0.01 percent. This was contradictory to what was reported in [25] . But there, the authors had used a uniformly distributed link cost topology, and their traffic was based on the Zipf distribution [41] . On the other hand, the traffic access logs of the 1998 Soccer World Cup are more or less double Pareto in nature [1] . In either case, the exploits and limitations of the technique under discussion are obvious. The plot also shows a near-identical performance by A"-Star and Greedy.
Next, we observe the effects of an increase in storage capacity. An increase in the storage capacity means that a large number of objects can be replicated. Replicating an object that is already extensively replicated is unlikely to result in significant traffic savings as only a small portion of the servers will be affected overall. Moreover, since objects are not equally read intensive, an increase in the storage capacity would have a great impact at the beginning (initial increase in capacity) but have little effect after a certain point, where the most beneficial ones are already replicated. This is observable in Fig. 7 , which shows the performance of the algorithms. GRA once again performed the worst. The gap between all other approaches was reduced to within 15 percent of each other. nRAG and Greedy showed an immediate initial increase (the point after which further replicating objects is inefficient) in its OTC savings but afterward showed a near-constant performance. GRA, although performed the worst, observably gained the most OTC savings (49 percent), followed by Greedy with 44 percent. Further experiments with various update ratios (5 percent, 10 percent, and 20 percent) showed similar plot trends. It is also noteworthy (plots not shown in this paper due to space restrictions) that the increase in capacity from 10 percent to 18 percent, resulted in four times (on the average) more replicas for all the algorithms. Next, we observe the effects of increase in the read and write frequencies. Since these two parameters are complementary to each other, we describe them together. To observe the system utilization with varying read/write frequencies, we kept the number of servers and objects constant. An increase in the number of reads in the system would mean that there is a need to replicate as many objects as possible (closer to the users). However, the increase in the number of updates in the system requires the replicas be placed as close to the primary server as possible (to reduce the update broadcast). This phenomenon is also interrelated with the system capacity, as the update ratio sets an upper bound on the possible traffic reduction through replication. Thus, if we consider a system with unlimited capacity, the "replicate everywhere anything" policy is strictly inadequate. The read and update parameters indeed help in drawing a line between good and marginal algorithms. The plot in Fig. 8 shows the results of read/write ratio against the OTC savings. A clear classification can be made between the algorithms. nRAG, A"-Star, and Greedy incorporate the increase in the number of reads by replicating more objects, and thus, savings increased up to 88 percent, while GRA gained the least, with OTC savings of up to 42 percent. To understand why there is such a gap in performance between the algorithms, we should recall that GRA specifically depends on the initial selection of gene population (for details, see [25] ). Moreover, GRA maintains a localized network perception. An increase in the number of updates results in objects having decreased local significance (unless the vicinity is in close proximity to the primary location). On the other hand, nRAG, A"-Star, and Greedy never tend to deviate from their global (or social) view of the problem.
Last, we compare the termination time of the algorithms. Various problem instances were recorded with C ¼ 20 percent and 45 percent and R=W ¼ 0:45 and 0.85. The entries in Table 9 in boldface represent the fastest time recorded over the problem instance. It is observable that nRAG terminated faster than all the other techniques, followed by Greedy, A"-Star, and GRA.
In summary, based on the solution quality alone, the replica allocation methods can be classified into three categories: 1) high performance (nRAG and Greedy), 2) medium performance (A"-Star), and 3) low performance (GRA). Considering the execution time, nRAG and Greedy did extremely well, followed by A"-Star, and GRA.
RELATED WORK
Recently, game theory has emerged as a popular tool to tackle optimization problems, especially in the field of distributed computing. However, in the context of data replication, it has not received much attention. We are aware of only three published articles that directly or indirectly deal with the data replication problem using game theoretical techniques. The first work [4] is mainly on caching and uses an empirical model to derive the Nash equilibrium. The second work [18] focuses on mechanism design issues and derives an incentive-compatible auction for replicating data on the Web. The third work [22] deals with identifying Nash strategies derived from synthetic utility functions. Our work differs from all the game theoretical techniques in 1) identifying a noncooperative non-price-based replica allocation method to tackle the data replication problem, 2) using game theoretical techniques to study an environment where the agents behave in a selfinterested manner, and 3) deriving a pure Nash equilibrium and pure strategies for the agents.
Readers are encouraged to see [24] for a comprehensive survey on the conventional (non-game theoretical) techniques used for the data replication problem.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we studied the problem of replicating data objects in the Web. The problem recognizes the need for simultaneous allocation of replicas and results in an optimization problem subject to the availability of storage and no deallocation of primary copy.
We tackled this optimization problem by using game theoretical techniques. A detailed discussion revealed that in a realistic system, agents have no incentive to cooperate and achieve a social optimum. To this end, we proposed nRAG, in which agents competed to host the replicas of different objects in a self-interested manner.
We plan to extend our work by making nRAG, a pricebased method. Pricing has natural incentives associated with them and are easy to implement. Our current nRAG system operates around a very tight circle. Most of the information needs to be explicitly delivered to the agents that in a price-based system is not necessary. The agents can self-tune their strategies based on the incentives they gain or lose due to the pricing. . For more information on this or any other computing topic, please visit our Digital Library at www.computer.org/publications/dlib.
